The Value of Public Sector Annual Reports and Annual Reporting Awards in Organisational Legitimacy by Ryan, Christine et al.
  
 
COVER SHEET 
 
 
 
Ryan, Christine and Dunstan, Keitha and Brown, Jennet (2002) THE VALUE OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR ANNUAL REPORTS AND ANNUAL REPORTING AWARDS 
IN ORGANISATIONAL LEGITIMACY. Accounting, Accountability and 
Performance 8(1):pp. 61-76. 
Copyright 2002 
 
Griffith Business School Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith 
University 
 
Accessed from:  https://eprints.qut.edu.au/secure/00003600/01/finalvaluepaper.doc 
             1 
 
THE VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR ANNUAL REPORTS AND ANNUAL 
REPORTING AWARDS IN ORGANISATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christine Ryan 
School of Accountancy 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane 
 
Keitha Dunstan 
School of Accounting and Commercial Law 
Victoria University of Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
Jennet Brown 
Department of Transport 
Brisbane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please address all correspondence to  
Dr Christine Ryan 
School of Accountancy 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane 
Queensland 
Australia 4000 
 
Email: cm.ryan@qut.edu.au 
Phone: 07 38644320 
             2 
 
THE VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR ANNUAL REPORTS AND ANNUAL  
REPORTING AWARDS IN ORGANISATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite considerable diversity in Australian public sector organisations, annual reports 
have been promoted as an appropriate tool to discharge the accountability of all 
government agencies. Further, annual reporting competitions have been promoted as a 
means of ensuring the quality of those annual reports. The limited prior research which 
addresses these positions ignores the possibility that there may be a variation in the value 
of both the annual report and the competition depending on the type of public sector 
organization. This study applies institutional theory, informed by accountability theory, 
to understand the influence of stakeholders on the annual reporting practices and policies 
adopted by organisations. It focuses on the Queensland public sector and the Queensland 
Annual Reporting Award (QARA) and uses a series of case studies to examine the value 
of the annual report. Consistent with institutional theory, the results indicate that both the 
annual report and competition entry were used as legitimising tools. Further, cross 
sectional variation in the perceived value of the annual report and the entry into the 
annual reporting competition was found.  
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THE VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR ANNUAL REPORTS AND ANNUAL 
REPORTING AWARDS AS A SIGNAL OF MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Australian public sector has been under an intensive period of reform since the early 
1980s.  Managerialist and corporate management philosophies have been promoted. 
These philosophies, with their accompanying reforms have focused on the efficiency of 
agencies, cost savings, streamlining of operations and commercially driven imperatives. 
Government agencies once held accountable for compliance with spending mandates are 
now accountable for their performance (Davis et al, 1993; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; 
Gray and Jenkins, 1993). This performance emphasis in management has led to a debate 
about the appropriate means of discharging public accountability and along with this an 
increased awareness of the value and role of annual reporting in the accountability chain. 
 
Despite the considerable diversity in the type of public sector agencies, the annual report 
is statutorily required as the primary medium of accountability (JCPA, 1989; QFMS, 
1994; PAEC, 1999; Likierman, 1992). It is argued that the annual report is provided to a 
wide range of stakeholders, and it is the only comprehensive statement of stewardship 
available to the public on the objectives and performance of the entity (Coy et al, 2001; 
Boyne and Law, 1991). However, there is little empirical evidence about the value of the 
annual report in the public sector.  
 
Further, organisations in Australia have organised annual report awards. The promoters 
of annual reporting awards argue that entering an agency’s report in an annual reporting 
award clearly demonstrates commitment to high quality reporting (QARA, 1997). This 
link between high quality reporting and annual reporting awards has motivated public 
sector researchers to investigate the incentives for entry into these annual reporting 
awards.  US public sector researchers have investigated the incentives for entering annual 
report awards to discharge accountability to stakeholders and/or to signal the quality of 
management. Two studies investigate the incentives of municipalities to apply for a 
Certificate of Conformance  (Evans and Patton, 1983; Evans and Patton, 1987). Evans 
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and Patton (1983) develop monitoring and signalling propositions that predict that entry 
into an award provides high quality management with a credible means of signalling that 
quality. They base their research on an assertion that the cost of entering the award for 
low quality managers would be prohibitive because of the extra time and effort needed to 
raise a low quality report to an acceptable standard.  Using their logic, it follows that non 
entry into an award provides a signal of low quality management. The explanations 
advanced by these researchers ignore the influence of political and social forces on 
organizations that may create cross sectional differences between organizations.1 
 
Institutional theory directly addresses the unique political and social forces upon 
organizations and while it is normally used to explain similarity in practices it also 
recognises that management is able to use discretion over their actions (see Oliver 1991).  
Consequently, the theory has the capacity to explain differences in policies and practices 
across different organisational sectors. This paper uses institutional theory’ informed by 
accountability theory’ to understand how institutions respond to political and social 
forces in their annual reporting practices in order to legitimize their existence. There are 
several reporting awards that are available to Australian public sector agencies.  This 
provides an opportunity to extend prior research into an Australian setting. This research 
will focus on the Queensland public sector and the Queensland Annual Reporting Award 
(QARA) to provide an opportunity to explain aspects of the practices and norms 
surrounding public sector annual reporting.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the theoretical framework. The 
method for the study and the results are then reported. The paper concludes with its 
findings, areas for further research and limitations of the study. 
                                                          
1 In the Australian public sector, there are four distinct types of agencies: local governments; government 
departments; government owned corporations and statutory bodies each with their unique structural, 
operating and financial arrangements. 
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2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Institutional theory, predicated upon the central tenet of legitimacy, posits that 
organisational success and survival depends on factors which go beyond “efficient 
coordination and control” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 p 352). Institutional researchers (see 
Scott, 1995; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Covalesi and Dirsmith, 1988) have isolated 
three specific elements of institutional pressures that tend to drive similarities in 
organisational practices: coercive isomorphism; mimetic isomorphism and normative 
isomorphism.2 It could be argued that the legal requirement to present an annual report is 
coercive isomorphism and organizations gain and maintain legitimacy by conformity 
with the specific rules and regulations that determine the contents of the annual report. 
Moreover, if entry into QARA is considered to be a socially accepted behaviour and 
organizations enter in order to protect their legitimacy by not standing out as being 
different, then this motive would be consistent with the concept of mimetic isomorphism. 
 
Public sector accounting researchers (see for example Cheng, 1992; Hepworth and Vass, 
1984; Guthrie, 1994; Parker and Guthrie, 1990) recognise the importance of a 
consideration of socioeconomic factors; political factors; the internal bureaucracy 
influences; and the external demands of stakeholders; in any analysis of accounting 
disclosures and practices.  Specifically, Cheng (1994), presents a diagrammatic 
representation of the potential list of internal and external stakeholders who are 
influential in the US public sector, and thus have an influence on accounting disclosures 
and practices. She considers Legislators, Chief Executives, and Bureaucratic Agents to be 
the key internal players in her politico-economic model. Her external actors include 
voters (taxpayers and clientele), interest groups and the media, creditors, accounting 
regulators, professional accounting associations, external auditors, and other 
governments. In addition to classifying the actors in terms of whether they are internal or 
external to the agency, the diagram outlines the links of influence between each of the 
                                                          
2 Coercive Isomorphism, or the regulative pillar is the elaboration of rules, requirements, state jurisdiction 
and pressures for conformity to public expectations and demands. Mimetic isomorphism is the modelling 
by organizations of similar organizations in their field which have been perceived to be more legitimate and 
successful. Normative isomorphism is the stabilising influence of social beliefs, values and norms that are 
imposed externally or internalised (see Scott, 1995 and DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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actors. While Cheng’s model does address the complexity of the relationships between 
public sector stakeholders, she fails to differentiate between the relative importance of the 
various links of influence.  In her model, all influences are treated of equal importance.  
A major advance would be made if the strength of those influences could be 
differentiated 
 
That differentiation could be made by examining the accountability literature.  There is 
general agreement that public sector accountability is more complex than that which 
exists in the private sector (Parker and Gould, 1999; Mulgan, 1997; Sinclair, 1995). Some 
researchers have made attempts to identify different types of accountabilities, arguing 
there is a diversity in the accountability relationships which affects the type of 
information given (see for example, Glynn and Perkins, 1997; Sinclair, 1995; Stewart, 
1984). Other researchers have argued that new public management has meant a move 
from external accountabilities to internal accountabilities, and in particular a focus on the 
accountability to the customer as opposed to accountabilities to the Parliament and the 
public (see Parker and Gould, 1999). 
 
While the boundaries of accountability are debated, so is its meaning. Accountability 
only exists where there is a relationship of authority such as exists between a principal 
and agent; a person who is supervised and the supervisor, a representative and those 
represented; an accountor and the accountee, and the subordinate and the superior 
(Mulgan, 1997; Stewart, 1994). The relationship does not exist between persons of equal 
status (Mulgan, 1997).  Mulgan (1997) argues that there are 4 processes or stages in the 
overall process of accountability.  Only one of these, the reporting function is laid on the 
accountor, ie. the one who is held to be accountable. The other three processes; 
information seeking, assessment or verification, and direction or control are rights 
belonging to the accountee, ie. the one to whom the account is owed. The crux of the 
accountability relationship is the ability of the accountee to assess and improve the 
quality of performance and have the power to make evaluations based on that report 
(Stewart, 1984;  Hoskin, 1996). It is the element of power to evaluate, and capacity to 
exercise this power which is the true essence of accountability.  To clarify this, Stewart 
(1984), distinguishes between two elements of accountability; that of a “bond of 
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accountability” and a “link of accountability”. He argues that the bond of accountability 
is a recognition of responsibility of one party to another, whereas the links of 
accountability are a recognition of a mutual expectation of responsiveness often 
developed over time as a matter of custom. Thus, it is the bond of accountability, the 
being able to hold to account that is crucial. The element of power, which is essential to 
the bond of accountability, he argues is not present in those relationships that have a link 
of account. 
 
The distinction between bonds of accountability and links of accountability and the fact 
that public accountability derives primarily from legal authorisation (Mulgan, 1997), 
provides the opportunity to differentiate the relative importance of the links of influence 
in Cheng’s model.  In addition, this differentiation and its application to the various 
internal and external stakeholders will be developed in accordance with the various 
institutional arrangements within the Australian public sector.  
 
Two different frameworks are developed of the “Chain of Accountabilities”.  Although 
the system of accountabilities are broadly similar in each, the context and stakeholders 
will change, and this can have important consequences for the operation of 
accountabilities. The first is applicable to three types of agencies in the Australian public 
sector; government departments, statutory bodies (SBs) and government owned 
corporations (GOCs), which operate within a Parliamentary system of government. A 
second framework is developed for local governments which work to another level of 
government.  Both diagrams indicate the multiplicity of stakeholders for public sector 
agencies, a theme which is acknowledged in prior literature (see for example, Parker and 
Gould, 1999; Burritt and Welch, 1997; Sinclair, 1995). 
 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that in the case of government departments, SBs and GOCs, 
bonds of accountability can be identified between the internal stakeholders: the CEO; the 
Board of Directors (in the case of some SBs and GOCs), the relevant Minister and 
Parliament; internal creditors (other public sector agencies), and the Auditor-General.  
Links of accountability can be identified between the other internal stakeholders being 
             8 
 
Treasury and other regulatory bodies. Further, bonds of accountability can be identified 
between the main external stakeholders: taxpayers/levypayers/shareholders; and external 
creditors (suppliers/lenders).  All other external relationships have links of accountability 
 
Figure 1  Chain of Accountabilities for Departments, Statutory bodies, GOCs  
 
 
Tax/levypayers/
shareholders
Parliament
(politicians)
Minister
(politician)
CEO
(bureaucrat)
Executives
(bureaucrats)
Interest
Groups2
Auditor- General
Treasury/
other reg
bodies
Media
Board of
Directors1
Creditors
(suppliers/lenders)
INTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS
EXTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS
Key: Bonds of accountability
Links of
accountability
Internal  creditors
1 For GOCs and some statutory bodies
2 Includes competitors/ customers/ clients/other equivalent
   public sector agencies
 
Figure 2 depicts the relationships for local governments. The relationship for external 
stakeholders in the local government framework seems similar to that depicted in Figure 
1. However, this is not the case for internal stakeholders. There are fewer bonds of 
accountability between the internal stakeholders. Most notably the bond ends with the 
elected officials (ie. the Councillors).  In the case of local government councils, the main 
internal stakeholders with bonds of accountability are the CEO, the elected councillors, 
and internal creditors. These stakeholders and their relationships are depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2  Chain of Accountabilities for Local Government Councils 
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From Figure 1 and Figure 2 it can be seen that there are variations in the types of 
stakeholders and in the relationships between them. Specifically, bonds of accountability 
have been differentiated from links of accountability.  Institutional theory suggests that 
management will respond to differences in institutional forces to protect their claim to 
legitimacy. Based on the premise that a bond of accountability arises through there being 
a power to hold to account, it is contended that the annual report has increased legitimacy 
and importance in these instances. This contention motivates Research Question 1.  
 
Research question 1  
 
Does the value of the annual report vary between different types of agencies? 
 
The framework is also useful to analyse the value of entry into the QARA as an 
enhancement of the legitimacy of the agency.  Voluntary entry into QARA provides 
management with an opportunity to highlight the quality of their financial reporting 
and/or to mimic other high quality reporting agencies who enter QARA. Similar to the 
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motivation for research question 1, it is contended that the value of QARA entry will vary 
depending on the unique circumstances of agencies. An investigation of research question 
2 will address this issue. 
 
Research question 2 
 
Does the value of entry into the QARA vary between different types of agencies? 
 
The next section provides an outline of the method adopted to address these 2 research 
questions. 
 
3.0 METHOD 
 
The Queensland Annual Reporting Awards (QARA) provides the point of focus for this 
study.  The stated aim for instigating the QARA was to improve the quality of public 
sector reporting (QARA, 1997).  The number of entries since the inception of the award 
in 1981 has steadily increased.  In 1981 there were only 16 entries as compared to a total 
of 50 entries in 1996.  Table 1 summarises the 1996 (the year of focus for this study) 
entries by type of agency. 
 
Table 1 Analysis of QARA Participation by Type of Agency 
 
Type of Agency Number of Entries Total Number of 
Agencies 
Rate of Participation 
Government Departments 15 25a 60% 
Statutory Bodies 20 201a 10% 
Government Owned Corporations 9 21a 43% 
Local Government 6 150b 4% 
Total 50 397 13% 
 
a QAO, 1996 
b ABS, 1997 
 
Despite the increased participation in the awards it can be seen that only 13% of the total 
eligible entrants chose to enter. When analysed on the basis of type of agency it is evident 
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that the rate of participation varies considerably. A high proportion of departments, 60%, 
chose to enter the award in 1996. The second most highly participating type of agency 
was the GOCs where 43% of total possible GOCs chose to enter. This contrasts sharply 
with the participation rate for SBs and local governments that were much lower, 10% and 
4% respectively. The implications of the different rates of participation will be 
considered further in the results section.  
 
The data source for this study is a series of case studies of Queensland public sector 
agencies across the four types of agencies; government departments, SBs, GOCs and 
local governments. The selection of the subjects for the case studies was made on a 
number of criteria.  The first criteria was that the agencies must have been identified as 
material by the Queensland Audit Commission (FitzGerald et al, 1996) or the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 1997). The concept of ‘materiality’ relates to the size of 
agencies and means that only the larger agencies were considered. Second, all agencies 
selected must have been Brisbane based to enable sufficient accessibility for the 
researchers. Third, the agencies were selected by choosing at least one “QARA enterer in 
1996” and one “QARA non-enterer in 1996”, from each state government agency type 
(departments, SBs, and GOCs); and from local government councils.  Fourth, all of the 
selected agencies must have entered the QARA in at least one prior year. This criteria 
was included to ensure a depth of understanding regarding the benefits and costs of 
QARA entry. Enterers had decided that entry was beneficial whereas non-enterers who 
had previously entered had made a deliberate decision to not enter and had therefore 
decided that the net value of their entry would be negative having already experienced the 
outcomes from entry.  One extra SB that was a QARA enterer was included in an attempt 
to obtain a broader coverage of the sector, which is diverse in terms of revenue source, 
and degree of commercialisation. The three statutory bodies chosen were the Queensland 
Building Services Authority which receives income primarily from industry levies; the 
Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation which was partially budget-funded 
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(approximately 40%); and Queensland Treasury Corporation which receives income 
primarily from investments.  It was expected that selecting agencies with different 
revenue sources, would result in information regarding whether revenue source type 
provides different benefits to entering the QARA. 
 
All agencies that were selected readily agreed to take part in the study. This high level of 
interest supports the contention of Davis et al (1993) that public sector agencies are very 
interested in issues concerning accountability and annual reporting. The agencies chosen 
as case study subjects are identified in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  Public Sector Agencies Selected for Interview 
 
Agency Type 1996 QARA Entry 1996 QARA Non-entry 
Departments Transport Department Education Department 
SBs Qld Building Services Authority 
Qld Tourist & Travel Corporation 
Qld Treasury Corporation 
GOCs Qld Industry Development Corporation Qld Investments Corporation 
Local Government Councils Pine Rivers Shire Logan City 
 
 
The primary source of data for this study was obtained through semi-structured 
interviews with a nominee from each agency. Semi-structured interviews were employed 
in an attempt to allow the researchers to direct the conversation while providing the 
respondent with every opportunity to freely express their views. King (1994) claims that 
to gain access into the underlying perceptions of the respondent it is imperative to strike a 
balance between the need to structure an interview with the need to provide the 
respondent with optimal opportunity to express their views without restriction through an 
abundance of open-ended questions.  This need to unearth the underlying perceptions of 
respondents rendered less personal approaches such as mail questionnaire unsuitable. 
 
All interviews were conducted in person on the premises of the agency. The interviewees 
have not been identified for confidentiality reasons, however, all agencies provided 
permission to be identified. To ensure transcription accuracy, all interviews were taped 
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(with the interviewee’s permission) and transcribed in full.  Interview times ranged from 
thirty minutes to seventy minutes, with an average time of forty minutes. The results of 
the interviews pertaining to the two research questions are outlined in the next section. 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Research question 1 
 
Does the value of the annual report vary between different types of agencies? 
 
The interviewees from all agencies agreed, in principle, that the annual report provided a 
valuable mechanism to discharge accountabilities. However, the usefulness of the annual 
report was perceived to vary for different stakeholders for the various types of agencies.  
 
The interviewees from the government departments, SBs and GOCs perceived that the 
annual report was an important accountability tool for their internal stakeholders.  From 
Figure 1 it can be seen that these agencies have a long chain of accountability with 
numerous internal stakeholders having the power to hold agencies accountable for their 
performance.  In these circumstances the use of an annual report provides a formal, and 
more complete document which reports on all aspects of an agency’s performance. These 
results are consistent with the normative research (see for example, PAEC, 1999), which 
holds that Parliament is the primary target audience for annual reports. These results are 
also consistent with New Zealand research by Hay (1994) who concluded that in the case 
of tertiary institutions, internal stakeholders were the main users of annual reports. 
 
In the case of local government, representatives agreed that the annual report was a 
valuable accountability tool for internal users, however, they perceived that 
supplementary methods of communication were necessary. The interviewees saw 
councillors as the main internal stakeholder to which local governments are accountable 
and felt that they were able to tailor specific information to meet their needs. The 
interviewees therefore thought that the supplementation of the information within the 
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annual report with other more specific information was a cost effective means of 
discharging accountabilities. 
 
In the case of the external stakeholders, all interviewees agreed that the annual report was 
a necessary accountability tool for external creditors. However, they did not agree that 
the annual report was a suitable tool for the discharge of bonds of accountability to all 
external stakeholders.  GOCs and those SBs which are externally funded also agreed that 
the annual report was the main accountability document given to their fundproviders 
(shareholders and levyholders).  This contrasts with government departments, budget 
funded SBs and local governments who did not see the annual report as the appropriate 
accountability document for their fundproviders (taxpayers and ratepayers). While 
accountability remains paramount for these groups, other means of communication 
through informal publications, brochures and media releases were thought to be more 
appropriate. This result supports the research of Kloot and Martin (2000), which showed 
that for local government ratepayers, news articles, radio segments, and community 
consultations are used to demonstrate accountability to ratepayers and the wider 
community. 
 
An explanation for this result lies in the diverse nature of fund providers to public sector 
agencies. In the case of government departments and budget funded SBs, the primary 
fund providers are taxpayers, while ratepayers are the primary fund providers for local 
governments. Taxpayers and ratepayers constitute a diverse group of ordinary citizens 
whose concerns are likely to be different to the shareholders and levyholders of GOCs 
and externally funded SBs. Thus it would appear that in those agencies where the 
external stakeholders are a diverse group, (taxpayers and ratepayers) and where the 
agencies are dependent on these stakeholders for the provision of funds, the annual report 
is replaced by more specific accountability devices.  This is consistent with the research 
by Sinclair (1995), who argued that alternative mechanisms to demonstrate accountability 
such as newspaper reports, other media channels and public hearings were used.  In 
contrast, and consistent with private sector research (see for example, Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978, 1986), agencies which obtain funds from a small and well defined 
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group (levy funded statutory bodies and GOCs) use the annual report as an accountability 
tool for communication. One explanation for these results across the different agencies, is 
that the annual report contains the basic audited statutory financial information, but 
limited performance information (FitzGerald et al, 1996).  Indeed, in some cases, the 
financial information comprises around 50% of the annual report.  If the primary 
emphasis of an agency is on service provision and not on primary financial information 
(as in the case of government departments, budget funded statutory bodies and local 
governments), then a small, more concise, specifically written document which highlights 
service achievements is more likely to be a more effective communication device in 
discharging accountabilities.  Indeed, the results of this study bear out this position. 
 
These results are consistent with the expectations of institutional theory that posits that 
there are a multiplicity of forces upon organizations that drive their particular policies 
and practices. Rather than simply complying with coercive regulation to present the 
annual report, the role and value of the annual report as a legitimatising tool varied 
between agencies in response to the unique needs and demands of their stakeholders.  
 
The next section will apply the same framework and the insights gained from research 
question 1 to address the second research question. 
 
Research Question 2 
 
Does the value of entry into the QARA vary between different types of agencies? 
 
The most cited overall benefit of receiving an annual reporting award was the positive 
publicity created. All interviewees agreed that the major benefit of entry into the QARA 
was that it provided an opportunity to gain external validation of the quality of reporting. 
They also all agreed that the external validation provided by the receipt of a QARA was 
regarded as an independent (credible) signal of the overall quality of management to the 
stakeholders. This result is consistent with the key tenet of institutional theory that of 
legitimacy. Organisations want to ensure their survival by being viewed as competent and 
acceptable (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Covaleski et al, 1993) and, in financial matters 
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as having the appearance of openness and honesty (Jeavons, 1994). Because of this, there 
is a tendency for organizations within a particular organizational field to mimic the 
practices of other successful agencies. In this instance, by using entry into QARA as a 
symbol of legitimacy. This result also provides external validation of prior US studies 
which identify that the major benefit of value of entry into annual reporting awards is that 
it provides a credible signal of both the quality of financial reporting and the quality of 
management.  Given apparent incentives to enter QARA and the evidenced low overall 
participation rates in the award (see Table 1), it would appear that there must also be 
strong disincentives for some organizations to enter. This is borne out by interviewees 
who cited both direct and indirect costs of entry. The direct cost of a $100 entry fee was 
not seen to be an important deterrent. The indirect costs were considered to be greater in 
magnitude and included both the cost of improving the annual report to a standard 
suitable for entry, and the cost of being exposed as a low quality reporter should the entry 
be unsuccessful. Therefore, the costs of mimicking high quality reporters through 
entering QARA would be higher for those agencies that produce low quality reports. The 
comments of the interviewees support the contention that the decision to enter depends 
on a cost/benefit analysis. The interviewees who were enterers all agreed that benefits of 
entering QARA exceeded the costs in that year whereas the non-enterers contended that 
the excessive costs of entry were not justified.  
 
Specifically, in relation to costs, interviewees either argued that the quality of reporting 
required by QARA was excessive or that they had an alternative means of obtaining 
external validation, in other words, alternative symbols of legitimacy were available.  The 
alternative symbols came either in the form of other externally credible legitimate 
symbols (for example, the achievement of a AAA rating), or alternative means of 
communication. In the case of local governments it was found  that other communication 
devices had more value than the annual report in discharging accountability (see 
Research Question 1). Consequently, it could be argued that entry in QARA is a less 
valuable legitimacy tool. This is supported by the data in Table 1 from which it can be 
seen local governments had the lowest participation rate of the four types of agencies.  
 
             17 
 
The findings for research question 1 were consistent with cross sectional variation in the 
value of the annual report. Specifically, the annual report was perceived as a valuable tool 
for the discharge of accountability, where a bond of accountability existed between the 
stakeholders. It was argued that for government departments, SBs and GOCs, there was a 
longer chain of accountability with numerous internal stakeholders having the power to 
hold agencies to account and that it was in these circumstances that the annual report was 
a valuable tool to discharge accountability.  Where the annual report is considered to be 
the primary tool for discharging accountability it would be expected that the receipt of an 
award would provide external validation of the quality of reporting.  This raises the 
expectation that these types of agencies have the most to gain from entering an annual 
reporting reward as a symbol of their legitimacy. Table 1 partially supports this position 
with government departments and GOCs having the highest rates of participation in 
QARA. However, the rate of participation for SBs is significantly lower at 10%. While 
this low level of participation seemingly contradicts the expectations it should be noted 
that this group is highly diverse in terms of revenue and functions. In fact of the 201 SBs, 
only 34 are material trading, or financial enterprises or universities as identified by 
FitzGerald et al (1996), with most of the rest being comprised of very small agencies 
such as area water and drainage boards. The appropriate participation rate in the annual 
reporting award for statutory bodies if only material agencies are considered is therefore 
closer to 59% (20 entries out of a possible 34).  
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has used institutional theory, informed by accountability theory, to investigate 
the role and value of public sector annual reports and entry into annual reporting awards.  
The results of the research are consistent with institutional theory in that they show that 
organizations respond to the political and social forces of their stakeholders in their 
adopted annual reporting policies, practices and routines.  There is evidence of cross 
sectional variation in the role and value of annual reports and that some organizations 
adopt alternative means of communication to claim their legitimacy. Further, the costs 
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and benefits associated with entry into QARA as a symbol of legitimacy were found to 
vary across organizations. 
 
These findings should be of interest to regulators who have emphasised the value of the 
annual report as a “one size fits all” mechanism to discharge accountability.  Policy 
makers may need to address the content of the informal communications that are being 
used to discharge accountabilities for many stakeholders of the agencies. Indeed, for 
those agencies that place low emphasis on the annual report perhaps a short form annual 
report would be more suitable. This would mirror the recent moves in the Australian 
private sector where the provision of a full annual report to shareholders is no longer 
mandatory. The findings also have implications for the promoters of annual reporting 
awards. Despite the seemingly low participation rates, for some organizations entry into 
QARA is seen to be a powerful symbol of organisational legitimacy and credibility, and 
provides the means for agencies to mimic other high quality reporters by entering. It 
therefore could be expected that participation rates in the future would increase. 
 
The study has some limitations. The first occurs as a result of the restrictions on the scope 
of the study.  By focussing on an annual reporting award in one jurisdiction in one year 
only (1996), it is possible that the data is unique to that jurisdiction in that particular year. 
In addition, the representative faithfulness of the perceptions of the research subjects is 
limited due to the very small and potentially biased sample. All interviewees were middle 
managers, and a different perspective may have been gained by interviewing Chief 
Executive Officers.  These would be overcome by extending the study to other years in 
different jurisdictions and by using a larger data set. 
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